

Message Text

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ACTION IO-13

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-09 ISO-00 AF-08 ARA-10 NEA-10

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-10 /129 W

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R 180030Z MAY 76

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7543

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 2142

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, UNSC, PT, PO

SUBJ: PORTUGUESE TIMOR - FRETELIN COMMUNICATIONS TO

UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. FOLLOWING CORRESPONDENCE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED AS UN
DOCUMENT S/12074, 14 MAY 1976:

QUOTE:

S/12074

14 MAY 1976

LETTER DATE 14 MAY 1976 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF MOZAMBIQUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO TRANSMIT THE TEXT OF TWO CONNICATIONS
FROM THE DEMOCRATIC REPULBIC OF EAST TIMOR. I WOULD BE
GRATEFUL IF YOUR EXCELLENCY WOULD ARRANGE FOR BOTH
COMMUNICATIONS TO BE CIRCULATED AS A DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY
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COUNCIL.

(SIGNED) JOSE CARLOS LOBO
AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY
AND PLENIPOTENTIARY
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE UNITED NATIONS

UNQUOTE

QUOTE:

ANNEXES

I. TELEGRAM DATED 4 MAY 1976 FROM MR. JOSE RAMOS HORTA
ADDRESSED TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
MOZAMBIQUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

PLEASE ARRANGE FOR THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION TO BE CIR-
CULATED AS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE SECRETARY COUNCIL.

"SECRETARY-GENERAL UNITED NATIONS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 389 (1976) IN ITS PARAGRAPH THREE 'REQUESTS
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO HAVE HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
TO CONTINUE THE ASSIGNMENT ENTRUSTED TO HIM UNDER PARAGRAPH
FIVE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 384 (1975)
AND PURSUE CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED'.

I HAVE BEEN ENTRUSTED BY MY GOVERNMENT, THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR, TO INFORM YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT
SUCH A VISIT MUST TAKE PLACE URGENTLY. THEREFORE, I AM
EXTENDING TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE INVITATION OF AUSTRALIAN
TRADE UNIONS AND AID ORGANISATION TO HAVE THE UNITED
NATIONS SPECIAL ENVOY TO TRAVEL ON THE BOAT WHICH IS DUE
TO LEAVE ON MAY 22 FROM CAIRNS ON THE NORTH-EAST COAST OF
AUSTRALIA.

IN DOCUMENT S/12060 OF 28 APRIL 1976 I HAVE GIVEN DETAILS
OF THIS HUMANITARIAN VENTURE. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE
INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES WILL SINK SHIP WHEN IT REACHES
EAST TIMOR TERRITORIAL WATERS. SUCH A THREAT
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MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AS IT IS A BLATANT VIOLATION
OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. NO PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE
CAN REMAIN SILENT FACING THIS CRIMINAL ACTION THAT HAS
BEEN CARRIED ON BY INDONESIAN GENERALS IN PREVENTING
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM REACHING THE PEOPLE OF EAST
TIMOR. THEREFORE I APPEAL TO YOU EXCELLENCY TO USE YOUR
GOOD OFFICES TO FACILITATE THE SUCCESS OF THIS MISSION.
I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAL TO ALL UNITED

NATIONS MEMBER STATES TO ENDORSE THIS TRULY HUMANITARIAN MISSION."

JOSE JAMOS HORTA
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS
AND INFORMATION
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR

II. LETTER DATED 4 MAY 1976 FROM MR. JOSE RAMOS HORTA
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS PREPARED AND SENT TO AUSTRALIA
BY A PROMINENT INDONESIAN POLITICIAN WHO OPPOSES THE IN-
VASION OF EAST TIMOR.

FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, HIS NAME CANNOT BE PUBLISHED. THIS
REPORT THROWS FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY
INTERVENTION IN EAST TIMOR. BY CIRCULATING IT TO THE UNITED
NATIONS MEMBER STATES, WE HOPE THAT PEACE-LIVING COUNTRIES
AROUND THE WORLD VOICE THEIR STRONG CONDEMNATION
FOR INDONESIAN CONTINUED AGGRESSION AGAINST THE PEOPLE
OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR IN DEFIANCE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS:

"DURING THE DECEMBER 7 INVASION IN DILI, I HEARD THERE
WERE ALREADY 10 BATAILLIANS - ABOUT 10 THOUSAND PEOPLE -
INDONESIAN SOLDIERS IN TIMOR FROM THE NAVY, AIR FORCE,
ARMY, AND EVEN FROM THE POLICE (MOBILE BRIGADE). THE DILI
INVASION WAS WELL PLANNED. THE ARMY TROOPS INTERMINGLED
WITH THE ANTI-FRETILIN FORCES, WOULD INVADE DILI FROM THE
WEST AND SOUTH. THAT IS WHY THERE WERE TWO 'MOVEMENTS':
A LONG MARCH ALONG THE NORTHERN COAST FROM BATUGADE-MAUBARA-
LIQUICA TO DILI, AND ANOTHER GROUP TRIED TO MARCH ALONG
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THE MOUNTAIN ROADS FROM BOBONARO-ATSABE, AILEU TO
DILI. BUT IT SEEMS THAT THIS LAST GROUP FAILED BECAUSE
OF THE WET MONSOON AND FRETILIN FORCES IN THE HIGHLANDS.

THE GROUP MARCHING ON TO DILI ALONG THE NORTHERN COAST
WAS PROTECTED BY THE NAVAL FORCES, WHO HAD BUILT STRONGHOLDS
IN THE ISLAND OF ALOR (EAST NUSA TENGGARA) AND WETAR
(MALUKU). THE ALOR BASE WAS MEANT AS A STEPPING-STONE
TO INVADE DILI, AND WETAR WAS THE STRONGHOLD TO INVADE
BAUCAU. THE OCCUPATION OF DILI AND LATER THE MARCH FROM
BAUCAU TO DILI WAS MEANT TO INVADE THE CAPITAL FROM FOUR
DIRECTIONS. BUT NOT ALL SUCCEEDED ACCORDING TO THE PLAN
BECAUSE OF FRETILIN RESISTANCE IN THE HIGHLANDS, BAUCAU,
AND EVEN ALONG THE NORTH COAST. ONE SMALL TOWN WEST TO
DILI WAS OCCUPIED ONLY AFTER 8 HOURS OF FIGHTING. EVEN

THE INVASION OF DILI WAS 6 HOURS TOO LATE (THE PLAN WAS
H-HOUR 6-O'CLOCK, BUT THE INVASION WAS REALIZED AT 12
O'CLOCK). SO, TOUGH FIGHTING INDEED*

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AFTER DILI WAS OCCUPIED BY THE INDONESIAN TROOPS,
REINFORCEMENTS WERE SENT ON-STOP TO EST TIMOR. NOW I
HAVE HEARD THAT THERE ARE ALREADY 35,000
TROOPS THERE. A BIG PORTION FROM ALL THE ELITE/COMMANDO
TROOPS HAVE BEEN SENT TO TIMOR LIKE THE RED BERETS (RPKAD),
ORANGE BERETS (KOPASGAT), VIOLET BERETS (KORPS MARINIR/
KKO), PLUS TROOPS FROM JAVA (ESPECIALLY FROM WEST JAVA
(DIPONEGORO) MOSTLY GOT DISPENSATION NOT TO BE SENT TO
TIMOR, BECAUSE THEY ARE SOEHARTO'S TROOPS), SUMATERA
AND SULAWESI. MOST OF OUR WAR MACHINES ARE SENT TO TIMOR,
TOO, OR STATIONED AT THE NEAREST BASES LIKE KUPANG AND
AMBON. ARMOURED CARS (PANSER) FROM THE CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS
IN BANDUNG IN WEST JAVA WERE SENT TO SURABAYA BY SPECIAL
TRAINS IN THE NIGHT, SO IT WOULD NOT ATTRACT TOO MUCH
ATTENTION.

ACTUALLY IT IS NO SECRETA NYMORE IN ONDINESIA. ESPECIALLY
IN JAKARTA, WHERE THE ARMY HOSPITAL (RS CATOT SUBROTO)

AND THE AIR FORCE HOSPITAL AT HALIM AIR BASE IN OVERFLLLED
WITH WAR VICTIMS. AND WHAT MAKES IT MORE TRAGIC IS THAT
THE FAMILIES - EVEN THEIR WIVES - ARE NOT ALLOWED TO
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VISIT THEIR HUSBANDS IN THE HOSPITAL. AT THE SAME TIME,
NEWS THAT MANY INDONESIAN SOLDIERS WERE KILLED BY THE
TIMORESE IS JUST TRICKLING DOWN IN JAKARTA AND WHOLE JAVA.
SO KNOWING THAT YOUR HUSBAND, SON OR FATHER HAS TO GO
TO TIMOR IS NEARLY AS SHOCKING AS A DEATH TRIAL/PENALTY.
SO, WHEN I SAW TROOPS COMING BACK FROM TIMOR LAST MONTH
(RED BERETS), I WAS NOT SURPRISED TO SEE THEM SO DELIGHTFUL,
RELEASED,, TALKATIVE BECAUSE THEY HAVE ESCAPED FROM
HELL. BUT TO BE CORRECT, THE BATTLE FRONT IS HELL BUT
LIFE IN DILI - S THEY TELL IT - HAS ITS BRIGHT COLOURS,
TOO. THEY WERE HAPPILY TELLING OF HOW CHEP CARS AND MOTORBIKES
ARE IN TIMOR NOW. AND WITHOUT ANY RELUCTANCE, THEY WERE
JUST SHOWING THEIR T-SHIRTS WITH THE LETTERS AND SYMBOL
'TEAM RAJAWAIL' (HAWK) AND 'AROUND THE TIMPORT'. THEY
WERE ADVANCED GROUPS THAT HAD BEEN SENT TO TIMOR 9 MONTHS
AGO* IMAGINE*

I DON'T KNOW HOW IT WILL GO ON THERE IN THE NEXT MONTHS.
JUST ACCEPTING EAST TIMOR ALREADY AS INDONESIAN TERRITORY
TO BE DEFENDED BY THE INDONESIAN TROOPS, THE ARMED FORCES
HAVE ALREADY DECIDED TO DIVIDE TIMOR IN MILITARY DISTRICTS
(KODIM) COMPLETE WITH THE OFFICERS TO BE STATIONED AS
DISTRICT COMMANDER (KOMANDAN KODIM OR DANDIM) IN EVERY KODIM.
THAT TASK IS CALLED 'TERRITORIAL TASK' TO DISTINGUISH
IT WITH THE SO-CALLED VOLUNTEERS 'INFANTRY TASKS'.
AND MAYBE YOU CAN TAKE THIS AS A SIGN THAT NOT THE WHOLE
EAST TIMOR TERRITORY IS ALREADY UNDER INDONESIAN CONTROL;
THE MILITARY TO BE SENT TO TIMOR FIND IT THE MORE
HARDER TO BE SENT FOR A 'TERRITORIAL' TASK THAN AN
'INFANTRY' TASKS. IT SEEMS THAT THEY REALISED THAT THEY
CANNOT YET TRUST THE POPULATION'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THOSE
INTRUDERS.

ACCORDING TO MILITARY SOURCES, THIS 'OPERASI KOMODO'
IS THE BIGGEST MILITARY OPERATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE.
I AM WONDERING WHO ACTUALLY PAYS FOR THIS BIG MILITARY
ADVENTURE, BECAUSE IF IT IS REALLY PAID FROM OUR NATIONAL
FUNDS IT WOULD BE A VERY BIG BURDEN FOR THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY ALREADY SUFFERING FROM THE \$10 BILLION PERTAMINA/
IBNU SUTOWO DEBTS. MAYBE, THE CIA IS PLAYING HERE ALSO,
BECAUSE IT IS ACTUALLY NOT A HANKAM (MINISTRY OF DEFENCE)
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PROJECT BUT ONLY A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF KOSTRADE GENERALS
ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT, HEADED BY GENERAL BENNY
MURDANI (EX GANYANG MALAYSIA FIELD OFFICER IN KALIMANTAN)
AND SUPPORTED BY GENERAL SOEHARTO HIMSELF. THE POLITICAL
OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH APODETI, IS COMMANDED BY
ALI MOERTOPO. SO THIS TRIO IS ACTUALLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR TIMOR."

(SIGNED) JOSE RAMOS HORTA
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND
INFORMATION, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
EAST TIMOR

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